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PREFACE 
Social Sciences and Humanities (SSH) do not usually take a preeminent role in technical 
research projects. Sister projects arise as part of Horizon 2020 Framework Programme as a 
way to address this historical constraint and to allow SSH make a meaningful contribution to 
the shaping of the research agenda. To this regard, Sister projects are created to go beside 
the mainstream research in order to challenge existing biases in the research agendas and 
trying out more daring alternatives through the widening of imaginaries and by taking into 
account the SSH perspective. 
CIFRA, as a Sister project, does not take the current status quo in the ICT patent ecosystem 
for granted, but on the contrary, explores the impact that potential new framings could 
have in ICT innovation and the value they could provide to the society. 
Moreover, CIFRA project has addressed the ICT Patent ecosystem from the perspective of 
the Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI), thus with the aim of determining the way it 
can be better aligned with the values, needs and expectations of society. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This document results from the work of the CIFRA project (Challenging the ICT Patent 
Framework for Responsible Innovation) and it follows and builds upon previous documents 
produced in the frame of that project, and namely the following. Document D2.1 “Literature 
Review”, reviews the literature around issues in the patent system, with a special focus on 
the ICT sector. In turn, document D2.2 “Empirical Evidence on ICT patents between 1990 
and 2012” is the result of the analyses of patent databases over the period 1990-2012 
exploring different patenting trends as well as the correlation between different factors 
such as measures associated with excessive patent fragmentation/proliferation and patent 
lags. Document 2.3 “Report on the Ethical Implications” explores the literature dealing with 
the ethical implications of patents in general, and patents in the ICT sector specifically. 
Taking those documents as the starting point the experts involved in the CIFRA project 
addressed a crucial question: how to improve the current system, especially at its margin, 
that is, without the need to make deep changes in the system. As a result of the literature 
analyses carried out at an earlier stage in the project, as well as, the discussions among the 
members of CIFRA consortium, a set of potential levers and tweaks in the system was 
identified, that could alleviate some of the detected issues. These potential solutions are 
described in chapter 2 of this document. 
Among the different intellectual property rights, the CIFRA project chose to focus on patents 
because patents are particularly relevant in ICT. We acknowledge upfront that findings 
might not be generalizable to other IPRs or industrial contexts. 
Chapter 3 of this document explores the example of open source software, as well as other 
copyright licenses not related to software, analyzing their characteristics, how they 
contribute to the societal welfare and wealth and to what extent they could be extrapolated 
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to the patents realm. As a result, a set of requirements is described for patent licenses that 
would mimic the example of open source software. 
2 PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE FRAGMENTATION WITH A SPECIAL FOCUS 
ON ICT 
This chapter describes different tweaks in the patent regime as well as other tools and 
levers that can be put in place or promoted as a way to overcome or minimize some of the 
issues depicted in CIFRA deliverables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. 
These proposals are not necessarily supported by any previous academic study, nor there is 
factual certainty that they will be useful in terms of solving the identified issues or whether 
they would cause side effects. On the contrary, they have been identified by the CIFRA 
consortium as tools with a potential impact on the identified issues, based on the in-depth 
literature review as well as on the personal expertise of the consortium member experts, 
and taking into account the opportunity provided to H2020 Sister projects to analyze more 
daring alternatives and to widen the imaginaries.  
The criterion to add a proposal in the set was the sustained opinion by at least a member of 
the CIFRA consortium that it may have a positive impact in at least one aspect of the system. 
Thus, the consortium has selected to have a wider set of proposals to be further evaluated 
by industry experts, rather than a smaller set on which there was a majority of the members 
positive about their potential beneficial effect, or even a consensus. 
Thus, the proposed levers do not reflect the position of the CIFRA consortium as a whole nor 
the position of any of its member companies. Nevertheless, they are the starting point for 
the interviews and the survey conducted as part of CIFRA work package 3, in order to check 
the perception of the different stakeholders in the ICT industry about the different 
proposals and to what extent they are worth exploring. 
The potential tweaks, tools and levers described in this chapter may be incompatible or 
even contradictory with each other. Moreover, it is foreseeable that different types of 
stakeholders tend to support different set of proposals. However, it is expected that the 
work conducted in the frame of CIFRA helps bring some clarity to regulators, legislators, 
patent offices and the different stakeholders so that a more balanced and less troublesome 
patent ecosystem can be reached by acting on the appropriate levers. 
2.1 STRICT NOVELTY REQUIREMENT 
Over the last decades, the patent offices observed how patent applications proliferated and 
how their scope tended to reduce. More patents were granted, but not more technology 
was disclosed. The Offices took it as an important task to counter that tendency by issuing 
programs to become stricter on certain requirements for the applicant, see for example the 
Raising the Bar program by the European Patent Office (EPO 2007) . They did not want, and 
© CIFRA Consortium 2017-2018                                                                                    Page 7 of 46 
also could not, change the legal framework. But they could play on certain administrative 
rulings and internal guidelines.  
That exercise was reinforced by a better understanding of the boundaries of patentable 
inventions, mostly for those relating to computer inventions. 
Overall, we welcome those efforts and expect that they result in higher quality patents 
being issued. Another positive effect being that some of the cases refused at the first 
instances have now gone into appeal. This will possibly result in more cases being decided. 
The corpus of cases will be likely to extend for the system, and that fine-tuning exercise also 
will eventually bring quality to the system.  
2.2 HIGHER FEES 
On one side, fees charged by the patent offices have been the subject of much debate for 
decades now. To lower entry barriers for start-ups and SMEs during the early stages of their 
life, patent offices had the tendency to subsidize fees for filing applications, publications and 
searches of prior art. Subsidies would largely mean that the cost of conducting that work 
would not be recouped by the fees imposed on those services. The equation would be 
balanced by considering the amount that other applicants and patent proprietors would 
need to pay in renewal fees. 
Recent trends of holding patent rights for shorter periods made that system become 
unstable. The reaction was in some cases to lower working times and improve efficiency to 
try not to subsidize too many products and services offered by the patent offices. Alongside, 
a push to more harmonization among patent offices may be driving some of those costs 
down or at least keeping them at bay. The debate is still ongoing as to what kind of system 
would be preferred, and whether higher fees would, in fact, be needed.  
On the other side, the main hurdle for the applicant of a patent remains at the billing hours 
of the patent attorneys. They usually add a margin on all their actions, as any other business 
would do. That puts extra pressure on the fees from patent offices to remain at low levels.  
In the framework of the present study, we advocate that the higher fees should come at the 
end of the patent life, even more strongly than currently, and in the form of higher renewal 
fees. Companies should be incentivized to implement or license their inventions. Indeed, 
achieving technological progress is one of the main drivers for the patent system, and that 
progress necessarily means implementing the technology into products and services that 
benefit our society. Thus, higher fees would de-incentivize (the stick model) keeping rights 
for dubious technology, at least for too long time. 
The advantage of higher fees has another angle. In some patent regimes, the offering of a 
widespread license to any third party results in lowered renewal fees. That saving is the 
positive incentive (the carrot), for the inventors to not give up the filing of a patent and at 
the same time to offer a wider license. This way the invention can find an easier way into 
becoming implemented in products and practiced by companies, what is perceived as a 
positive aspect for the society at large.  
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2.3 ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR SMES (FURTHER REDUCTION OF FEES, SUBSIDIES) 
As previously explained, increasing the different patent prosecution and maintenance fees 
can be a useful lever to avoid the proliferations of low-quality patents or to shorten the 
effective protection duration over inventions. However, increasing the fees may have side 
effects, especially with regards to small entities (e.g. SMEs, start-ups), which could end up 
not being financially able to protect their inventions. 
In order to facilitate the protection of the inventions of small entities, two main types of 
measures can be put in place: reduction of fees and subsidies. The former type has already 
been put in place by many patent offices. For instance, the European Patent Office (EPO) 
grants a 30% reduction in filing and examination fees for small and medium-sized 
enterprises, individuals, non-profit organizations, universities or public research 
organizations. The EPO understands by SME those companies with fewer than 250 
employees, an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million and an annual balance sheet 
not exceeding EUR 43 million and for which no more than 25% of the capital is held directly 
or indirectly by another company that is not an SME. 
A measure of SMEs purely based on the number of employees may be misleading, as SMEs 
with just a few employees may have extremely high revenues. Therefore, these mixed 
criteria by the EPO point at the right direction. However, a further categorization of SMEs 
may be carried out based on the two factors, and different actions may be targeted to each 
category. Subsidies to small entities are also a common practice. For instance, the Spanish 
government regularly issues subsidies to foster the protection of inventions by means of 
patents by SMEs and another type of entities, of up to 90% of the fees and translation costs 
in the case of SMEs and individuals. The German government grants voucher to companies 
applying for patents for the first time. 
The fact is that, even with existing reduced fees, and subsidies the costs associated with 
patents are a crucial factor for SMEs in their decision on whether to patent inventions or 
not. Therefore, it is worth considering whether additional reductions and/or subsidies or 
more granular ones, depending on the actual company size, could be beneficial. 
2.4 REQUIRING A MINIMUM LEVEL OF IMPLEMENTATION OF INVENTIONS AS PRE-REQUISITE TO 
GRANT 
Most of the patent offices around the world require that the patent application contains 
enough information to allow an expert in the relevant field to understand and replicate the 
invention. Otherwise, a patent examiner may object to granting exclusive rights based on an 
insufficient disclosure of the invention. Indeed, easy examples of refusals would include 
alleged invention claims on cancer curing compositions or equipment based on 
superconducting materials that are not yet scientifically or technically available off-the-
shelf.  
The cases are not always easy to spot, and a comprehensive appraisal of the invention 
needs to be made at the very early stage of examining a patent application. In most of the 
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cases, this analysis happens some years before the resulting technology gains commercial 
interest, and thus there is an incentive for the inventor to implement the technology.   
Typically, it is easier to scrutinize the claims of such early patents when firms compete neck-
to-neck like in the case of a duopolistic industry. Indeed, if two players dominate the market 
and technology is a key driver, those two parties will be likely to oppose one another’s 
inventions. As those companies are knowledgeable of the technical merits and limitations of 
certain solutions, they could easily spot a lack of features leading to a defective 
implementation of the invention. That competitor could thus comment, file arguments, 
oppose or even intervene in the patent proceedings. As a result, only high-quality patents 
would be allowed to be issued or granted.  
Nowadays, that duopolistic situation is rather a rarity. Thus, without the close scrutiny of 
competitors, objections by patent examiners tend to focus on the difference of the 
invention over the found or revealed prior art.  
Unless the examiners arm themselves with convincing evidence, they cannot revert the 
onus of the proof to the patent applicants. This only happens in limited fields of technology. 
For instance, active principles of chemical and pharmaceutical compounds may require the 
submission of experimental data.  
In former times, small mechanical prototypes were required to exemplify and demonstrate 
the main features and effects of every invention. The requirement fitted well with the 
workings of small or medium-sized mechanical contraptions for the agricultural 
mechanization that took part in the nineteenth century. This requirement was gradually 
replaced by the fiction of a plausible implementation, mostly based on evidence that it 
needed only proof that some effect was likely to happen, and that level of likelihood was 
sufficient in 50% of the cases.  
Inventions were allowed to be defined in abstract terms of excruciating complexity. In many 
instances, the used obscure or blurred terminology would even result in descriptions 
unknown to the most knowledgeable person skilled in the relevant field. And so, the level of 
abstraction raised so much, those vague ideas became patents eligible without anyone 
noticing. Patent proliferation resulted, and also legal certainty suffered.  
Thus, a lesser proliferation of speculative patenting could be by-product of stringer 
requirements concerning disclosing implementation examples in the patent documentation. 
Indeed, if the sufficiency of the disclosure would thoroughly be examined during early 
stages, patents would tend to include more technical information.  
Without advocating going back in time, the leap forward may need that more attention is 
given to implementations. The technical level of patent documentation would not only 
improve to provide more legal certainty; it would also become a preferred source of 
technical information for those really wanting to implement the invention. Technology 
copycats would immediately know that a license for a certain technology was needed, as 
the reading of implementation cases would come alongside the reading of well-defined 
exclusive rights.  
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An example of the adoption of this kind of measure is the Australian Intellectual Property 
Laws Amendment Act 2012 which requires, from April 2013, to disclose a specific, 
substantial and credible use for the invention in the patent specification. 
It should be taken into account that this kind of measure would require additional costs and 
effort for the entity owning the invention and thus make access to patents even more 
difficult for small cash-constrained firms or individual inventors. 
2.5 REDUCING PATENT SCOPE 
The scope of a patent has not received a lot of attention by legislators. It has deserved some 
research by academics. However, in the empirical literature on patents, sometimes the 
scope of the patent is measured through the number of claims, which is perceived as a too 
simplistic measure. 
In general, the patent scope has been seen as a tool at the disposal of patent examiners or 
judges when trying to ascertain the limits or boundaries of specific inventions, as defined by 
their claims. For instance, if a certain effect was claimed for a range of variables, say that 
effect would happen for a certain gas under a combination or ranges temperature, pressure 
and volume parameters, the examiner would not raise an objection without hard evidence 
that a part of those ranges would not have the desired effect. Again, the burden of proof 
rests primarily on the patent examiner.  
All those cases and the legal principles attached to them would only trickle into slow 
emanating jurisprudence. Time spans counted in decades could be envisaged, if individual 
cases needed to multiply and be collected as case trends, and that all to generate interest 
and attention from those drafting guidelines at the patent offices. This juridical system has 
proven itself not to be suited for the faster technology cycles found in certain industry fields 
nowadays. 
It is up to the legislation to establish new ways, where new cycles would need faster tracks, 
but also an increased legal certain for implementers of technology. In establishing that the 
burden of proof for every use case or every useful embodiment rests on the applicant or 
patent proprietor, there would be a renewed interest to file experimental data alongside 
the patent. 
It would be interesting to see whether the boundaries of the invention can be defined, not 
by words or linguistic terms on claims, but also by graphs or experimental data. Those 
graphs, with temperatures, pressures and volume of certain gases, would define the ranges 
and so contain well-defined and restrictive boundaries.  
2.6 REDUCING PATENT LIFETIME 
At this moment, the maximum duration of the patent rights is fixed and non-dependent on 
the type of technology or any other aspect. However, it may be that one-size-fits-all is not 
the optimum approach, and a more flexible scheme can have some advantages for certain 
sectors. 
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In the specific case of the ICT sector, the pace of technological progress is so fast, the 
product lifecycles are so short and the technologies so interlaced and interdependent, that 
20 years’ monopolies may be seen as a threat to subsequent innovation rather than an 
incentive, especially when patent holder decides to keep the monopoly over the invention. 
In these cases, changing one parameter in the equation, be it forcing the patent holders to 
license their patents (License of Right) or shortening the patent protection term, could be 
beneficial in terms of fostering innovation. Intermediate approaches could also be perfectly 
valid options, for instance, patents with a term of 20 years but with exclusion rights just in 
the first ‘x’ years, e.g. 8 years. 
An issue that complicates a scheme with reduced patent lifetime is the fact that patent 
rights can start to be fully enforced just once the patent is granted, what usually takes a 
significant time. That becomes a more relevant problem, if the patent lifetime were to be 
reduced, as the effective period of the patent term would decrease significantly and would 
eventually represent just a small share of the overall term. Therefore, such a scheme would 
be fully useful just if the patent examination were accelerated to ensure patent owners 
have a minimum guaranteed effective protection period. 
2.7 DUAL IP REGIME 
Back in 2007, the EPO’s report, Scenarios for the Future (EPO, 2007), envisaged four 
potential scenarios for the evolution of the society and, as a result, of the patent system. 
One of these scenarios, the “Blue Skies”, described the situation where innovation pace in 
ICT sector is continuously accelerating and becoming more and more cumulative. Under this 
assumption, an ICT patent landscape with growing tensions was depicted, as opposed to a 
well-functioning system in other sectors such as the pharmaceutical, what lead to 
considering a bifurcation of the patent system, in order to adapt to the needs and 
characteristics of different sectors. 
In fact, technologies in ICT sector may require wider technology diffusion and more 
collaborative innovation whilst avoiding issues such as patent thickets. The complexity and 
overlap of certain technologies prevent from exploiting them individually and requires 
instead having the right over a set of different inventions in order to be able to effectively 
exploit them. 
In order to overcome this issue, certain tools are available around the patent system, but 
not as an integral part of it. For instance, the IPR policies of most SDOs (Standard 
Development Organization) bind their members to compulsory licensing of Standard 
Essential Patents on FRAND (Fair Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory) terms as a way to 
ensure that the standard can be effectively implemented. 
The question arises on whether this kind of models can be implemented as part of the 
patent system, i.e. as part of the patent laws, so that it can be applied to a wider set of 
technologies, that is not just to standardized technologies, and without the need of external 
and heterogeneous tools such as SDO’s IPR policies. 
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As depicted in Scenarios for the Future (EPO, 2007), a dual IP regime could combine the 
regular regime with a softer IP regime under which patent holders would no longer be able 
to block the use of a technology, but instead, they would be obliged to license it under 
specific conditions.  
The regime applicable to each invention could be mandatorily determined by the 
technological area of the invention or, preferably, could be a matter of choice by the 
applicant. In the latter case, some levers would be needed in order to compel the applicants 
to give up some of their rights, such as the exclusion right. These levers either could be 
longer validity periods for soft patents or reduced fees throughout the patent lifetime. 
As of 2017, we can certainly admit that the society has evolved in many aspects towards the 
“Blue Skies” scenario over the last ten years, therefore it is worth considering the solutions 
hinted in that report, as potential solutions to tensions in the system. 
2.8 ENHANCING PATENT PLEDGES 
The level of complexity of ICT products and services usually requires licenses over a myriad 
of Intellectual Property assets from a huge number of companies. Only if there is a 
willingness to license the patents associated with this type of complex products and services 
by the different players, they can be effectively produced.  
One of the most amazing examples of collaborative innovation ever happened are mobile 
networks, in whose development has collaborated a large number of companies and in 
which manufacturing, deployment and exploitation take part an even larger number of 
companies across the different parts of the value chain. All these actors make the provision 
of a service possible, which already benefits 5 billion subscribers1. This has been possible 
thanks to two complementary mechanisms: standardization and patents. Standardization 
allows different entities to discuss about the different technological proposal and choose 
the most suitable ones, which become part of the standard and are meant to be used by the 
whole industry. On the other hand, patents are the tool that allows companies to share 
their innovations, with the conviction that they will not be used without rewarding the 
patent owners for their investment in innovation. Allowing to combine both mechanisms 
and to make the standard effectively implementable, the IPR policies of SDOs (Standard 
Development Organization) bind their members to license essential patents, that is, those 
that read on the standard. SDOs’ IPR policies are probably the most successful patent 
pledges at this moment, understanding by patent pledge a voluntary limitation of some of 
the rights linked to a patent. 
There is though some room for improvement of IPR management in standardization. In 
addition, there is an opportunity to extend the example of SDOs to patent pledges in other 
fields beyond standards, as well as to make patent pledges more formal and reliable. These 
points are tackled in the following subsections. 
                                                     
1 Figure reached in June 2017 according to the GSMA: https://www.gsma.com/newsroom/blog/mobile-
industry-celebrates-5-billion-subscriber-milestone/  
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2.8.1 Enhancing IPR Management in Standardization 
Even being quite successful, the management of IPRs in SDOs mainly by means of the SDOs’ 
IPR policies has some room for improvement.  
Two relevant areas of improvement are transparency and reliability. On one hand, potential 
licensees need to have as much information as possible regarding the patents that need to 
be licensed in order to implement the standard. For instance, it is advisable that owners of 
Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) explicitly disclose essential patents, indicating to which 
parts or features of the standard are essential, and whether those features of the standard 
are mandatory or optional. In addition, it is recommended that SEP owners update this 
information as the patents evolve throughout patent prosecution and as the standard 
further develops. For instance, patent applications that are essential at the time of 
declaration may not be essential later on, as the scope of the patent may change during 
prosecution and/or due to the standard changing during the standard development process. 
If the declarations of essential patents are not updated accordingly upon this kind of events, 
they may not be fully reliable. 
All these previous facts may lead to over-declaration, that is, more patents are declared 
than those that are effectively essential, what may mislead the prospective licensee. 
Another fact is that declarations are made by the SEP owners in good faith but, in general, 
SDOs do not have an independent process to check the actual essentiality of declared 
patents. Due to the inherent costs of independent essentiality checks, SDOs do not put in 
place such processes. As providing comprehensive claim charts would be a burden on SEP 
holders, SDOs face opposition upon considering requesting them to declarants. However, it 
is advisable to look for compromises that do not imply a heavy burden on SDOs or SEP 
holders, whilst providing information as accurate and reliable as possible to prospective 
licensees. 
2.8.2 Enhancing Patent Pledges 
In addition to the previously described commitments by SDO members, other companies 
and organizations make pledges, self-imposing certain limitations to the exercise of the 
rights granted by their patents. Patent pledges may have different forms and can be done 
for diverse reasons and purposes (Contreras 2015, Contreras 2017), but we could say that a 
common denominator is the intent to promote a collaborative ecosystem, and minimize 
litigation, what sometimes may be a side effect of the strategic or commercial goals of the 
pledging entity. 
However, as pointed out by Chien (2015) the patent system does not provide universal 
procedures to waive some of the rights granted by patents. In addition, there is no 
confidence in the industry about the reliability of such commitments. This may be due to a 
variety of reasons, which should be tackled in order to make patent pledges a widely 
accepted practice.  
On one hand, patent pledges should be homogenized into a reduced set of well-known and 
proofed licenses. The equivalent to patent pledges in the realm of the software’s copyright 
is the Open Source Software (OSS) licenses. In that case, the Open Source Initiative (OSI), 
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has defined some criteria that an open source license should comply with in order to be 
qualified as such2. Moreover, OSI has a license review process that allows certifying that a 
proposed open source license complies with the principles. The list of approved licenses is 
published in OSI’s web page3. Despite the list being quite extensive, it is worth mentioning 
that just a reduced set thereof accounts for an overwhelming majority of the licenses used 
in practice. This causes that those licenses have already been extensively used and proofed 
by the industry, and thus are reliable enough. This virtuous circle is missing for the patent 
equivalent. In fact, there is neither a well-recognized entity providing formal definition and 
categorization of patent pledges nor the patent offices offering flexible tools to 
accommodate the requirements of the industry, providing at most the option to declare the 
willingness to license a patent (License-of-Right). Thus, the industry lacks some well-known 
and proofed patent pledge licenses or contracts, which are reliable for both, those 
companies that voluntarily wish to waive some rights, and those companies willing to rely 
on the vows of the pledging company and need to be sure that they are legally binding. 
Another problem is the absence of a register in which to record the pledges, with exception 
of the License-of-Right stored in the patent record by some patent offices. In the OSS 
equivalent, the pledge (license) is bound to the asset itself, as it is usually included in the 
header of each source code file and/or in a separate license file distributed together with 
the source code. In order to record patent pledges and provide some certainty that they are 
cast in stone, a suitable patent pledges register should be established. The most 
recommended approach would be to register the pledges at the patent offices themselves 
(e.g. as part of the patent record), but other sorts of official registers could be considered. 
2.9 ENHANCING PATENT POOLS 
Patent owners think of themselves as owners of technology solutions. This is, in most of the 
times, not the case. Some owners have part of solutions, but others own alternatives or 
have other complementary pieces of technologies. A blocking situation is in many instances 
avoided by arriving at cross-licensing deals. However, direct negotiations are impractical 
when technology is fragmented and partially owned by hundreds, if not thousands.  Patent 
owners have then, traditionally organized themselves in patent pools, especially when 
standard-related technology needed to be massively licensed internationally.  
Patent pools have internal organization rulings that seem to vary for every program. The 
effort and time for their formation are very high, and reaching consensus or unanimity has 
been a formidable obstacle that has grinded programs to a halt, either by a lack of 
consensus or by attrition between licensors and would-be licensee’s discussions.  
A better system for managing expectations or over-expectations by many small owners or 
partial solutions would be welcome.  
                                                     
2 https://opensource.org/osd 
3 https://opensource.org/licenses/ 
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On the other hand, incentives to IP owners to join a patent pool are known, but not so much 
for those to-be licensees that would take the courage to be among the first parties to pay 
license fees.  A transparent system of incentivizing licensees and ex-ante discussions with 
pool administrators could break that spell for the first-mover licensee.  It would be desirable 
to let licensees take a pro-active role, while still keep them under a certain form of stealth 
needed not to attack unwanted attention as a target for litigation. 
2.10 CLEARING HOUSES  
Clearing house models might be another approach to facilitate access when many patents 
are present. The term ‘clearing house’ has its origin in the banking sector. It refers to the 
mechanism by which cheques and bills are exchanged among banks being members of 
clearing houses to transfer only the net balances in cash.  
Meanwhile, the concept has received a more general meaning that refers to mechanisms by 
which suppliers of goods, services or information and their customers are matched. 
In the context of patents, clearing houses facilitate the access to patented innovations by 
centralizing scattered patent rights. Van Overwalle (2017) distinguishes four models of 
clearing houses according to their functions. Two models provide access to patented or 
otherwise protected information. On the one hand, an information clearing house provides 
tools for exchanging technical information including IPR related insights. Examples include 
public accessible patent search sites provided by patent offices or commercially operated 
search tools. On the other hand, technology exchange clearing houses are platforms 
providing information services that display the available technologies to allow technology 
owners and buyers to initiate licensing or transfer negotiations. Complementary, more 
comprehensive mediating and managing facilities might be offered. It has to be pointed out 
that the negotiations related to the displayed technologies have to be conducted with the 
specific patent holders and not with the technology exchange clearing house. Such models 
are not very expensive but are challenged by achieving critical masses of patents needed to 
make such platforms successful.  The other two more elaborate models provide not only 
access to the patented inventions, but also standardize their use. The standardized licenses 
clearing houses offer standardized licenses including various options depending on the 
specific features of the rights, like the type of customer, the objective of the use and the 
characteristics of the final products implementing the licensed technologies. Portals guiding 
both licensors and licensees might even generate customized licensing contracts, which are 
reducing transaction costs for both sides. Creative Commons is an example for a 
standardized license clearing house focusing on copyright-protected content, such as music, 
movies or books. However, Science Commons trying to replicate the copyright-focused 
approach of Creative Commons for patented technologies was not so successful. Finally, the 
royalty collection clearing house integrates all functions of the previously introduced three 
models plus a mechanism to collect license fees from users on behalf of the patent owners 
in return for the access to and use of the inventions. The patent holder is reimbursed by the 
clearing house management, which sometimes also manage patent pools, according to a set 
allocation formula, which has been negotiated beforehand. Classical examples of royalty 
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collection clearing houses include copyright societies such as the American Society of 
Composers, Authors and Publishers or other national agencies. 
Overall, the principle of clearing houses has been successfully applied in the life sciences. 
Successful examples in ICT area are still missing. Although some clearing houses in the area 
of biotechnology are administrated by established patent pool managements. Regulations 
for PAEs 
Patent assertion entities (PAEs) are entities whose business model is based on purchasing 
patents and asserting them to generate revenue rather than implementing and further 
exploiting the patented technology.  
PAEs play a certain a role in the ICT patent ecosystem by allowing the exploitation of patents 
from small entities that would otherwise not be financially able to enter into litigation. 
Nevertheless, they have a dubious reputation due to the disturbing effect that their 
aggressive litigation and their usually excessive licensing demands have on practicing 
entities and final users. 
PAEs are a specific type of non-practicing entity (NPE), that is, an entity that does not make 
or sell products and thus is immune to countersuits for patent infringement. Other types of 
NPEs are for instance universities, research centers, semiconductor design companies or 
even individual inventors. The main difference between PAEs and other types of NPEs can 
be therefore based on NPEs R&D investment, or in another way, whether their patents are 
the result of their innovation or in the case of PAEs of a sheer asset acquisition. This 
difference may be used as a way to develop any type of regulation that is targeted 
specifically to PAEs. 
Regulation about PAEs, and in general about patent litigation, should definitely take into 
account the interest of the society as a whole, and for instance the interruption of public 
services (e.g. telephony or utilities) should be prevented, and instead alternative ways to 
ensure that intellectual property rights are respected should be sought and put in place. In 
general, the appropriateness of injunctive relief should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, 
taking into account the public interest and the existence of other levers to make intellectual 
property respected. 
2.11 MAKING SDOS IPR POLICIES (FRAND) COMPATIBLE WITH OPEN SOURCE LICENSING 
MODELS 
Standardization and open source projects represent two types of collaboration activities 
between different companies and individuals in order to build a technology or product, 
without the need of a direct commercial agreement between them. In general, different 
business models can be built around these two frameworks.  
In the case of standards developed under FRAND policies, the standardization process 
implies an associated technology market in which entities contributing their patented 
technology to the standard receive a fair reward for their innovation investment. 
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In the case of standards developed under royalty free policies, as well as open source 
projects under licenses with patent clauses, the situation is completely different. Namely, 
the entities contributing to the standard or OSS project do not expect a direct reward for 
their contribution. Instead, they usually expect that the standard or the project will create 
an ecosystem from which they would benefit in some way like, for instance, providing 
professional services or by means of adjacent products. 
However, the trend to “softwarization” of a widening range of technologies, especially in 
the ICT sector produces a closer dependency between standards and software. This trend is 
causing a closer interaction between SDOs and OSS projects, in order to benefit from 
potential synergies between both worlds. In fact, having the two processes, standard and 
OSS reference implementation, running in parallel can yield many benefits. For instance, an 
early implementation of a draft standard can help to detect bugs, to prove the validity of a 
specification or simply to accelerate the time-to-market for standardized technology. 
Nevertheless, conflicts may arise because of the contrasting business models and policies in 
both worlds. For instance, companies owning many standard essential patents may be 
excluded from contributing to associated OSS projects, as it would imply granting a RF 
license over their essential patents, thus losing the way to get a return on their innovation. 
On the other hand, companies contributing to the OSS projects may not be bound by the 
commitments of the SDO IPR policy, if they are not members of the SDO or are not 
participating in the corresponding working group. This fact may create some risks when 
updating the standard as result of the feedback from the OSS implementation, as 
contributions may not be bound by FRAND commitments and implementations other than 
the OSS reference implementations may be theoretically blocked. 
Therefore, it would be advisable to define a framework in which a close collaboration 
between standardization and OSS is possible, benefiting from the synergies of both worlds 
whilst solving the two previously mentioned problems. Firstly allowing for different business 
models by the different types of stakeholders and secondly providing certainty to the 
implementers that there is no risk to be blocked by any company contributing to the 
ecosystem as long as the implementer is willing to take the corresponding licenses on 
FRAND terms, whenever needed. 
This may be possible by adapting the IPR policies and procedures of SDOs to allow for a 
closer collaboration with OSS, which may be even run under the umbrella of the SDO itself. 
ETSI is working along these lines, and in fact, a specific working group, the ETSI Board OSS, is 
working to define this framework. 
2.12 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
Mediation, arbitration and expert determination are the most common types of alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms that parties may use to settle IP disputes instead of resorting 
to litigation. 
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In general, the use of any of these mechanisms is consensual, that is, can only happen if 
both parties agree either when the dispute arises or in a contract signed prior to the 
conflict. Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms have advantages4 and disadvantages, 
and its suitability depends on multiple factors, but in general, they are perceived as less 
troublesome and traumatic than litigation. 
One of the key problems in the ICT patent ecosystem is the difficulty to match the supply 
and demand for each and every pair of IP owner and IP user. This problem is linked to the 
complexity of the system, with a large number of patent owners and a huge number of IP 
consuming companies. Although patent pools help to simplify this process, they do not solve 
it entirely. In fact, both patent “hold-up” and “hold-out” behaviors are to be observed. 
Patent “hold-up” occurs when a patent holder asks for disproportionate royalties to a user 
of the patent that is in a vulnerable situation, e.g. has already implemented a standard 
relying on the FRAND commitment of patent holders. On the contrary, patent “hold-out” 
occurs when a company routinely ignores patent licensing demands by patent owners 
(Chien, 2014).  
In such a complex and globalized ecosystem alternative dispute resolution mechanisms can 
be helpful in order to determine the need to take a license by the assumed patent user and 
a fair compensation for the patent owner. Firstly, a single procedure can help to determine 
these aspects on a global scale without the need to opt for a complex multi-jurisdictional 
litigation. Secondly, it is easier to determine mutually acceptable licensing rates, when an 
independent third party is involved. In addition, mediators and arbitrators can be selected 
among specialized experts for each individual case, and therefore may be more specialized 
than judges and courts. 
In order to fully benefit from alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, there should be a 
broad agreement in the industry to use them instead (for the case of arbitration) or before 
(in the case of mediation) considering resorting to litigation. These agreements could be a 
good practice promoted by the regulators, industry organizations or even requested by 
companies to their providers. 
2.13 MORE VISIBILITY TO LICENSING TERMS 
One of the challenges to reach agreements on licensing terms is the scarcity of comparable 
examples. 
Licenses may be determined in different ways, for instance as part of bilateral negotiations 
or with help of alternative dispute resolution procedures. In these two cases, licensing 
arrangements are usually private and confidential to the involved parties. In addition, 
licensing terms can be determined as part of patent infringement lawsuits, in which case 
awarded damages are usually published and act as a reference for similar licenses in the 
future. However, most of the patent infringement disputes settle (Kesan 2006), as 
settlement provides some incentives, such as saving time and cutting huge litigation 
                                                     
4 http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/advantages.html 
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expenses, or preventing litigated patents being invalidated as part of associated nullity 
actions. Moreover, as opposed to the sentences, settlement arrangements are generally 
confidential to the parties reaching the agreement. 
Patent pools are another source of licensing rate information. However, it may be argued 
that licensing rates in patent pools are not necessarily comparable to bilateral licenses for 
different reasons. For instance, Gilbert (2002) describes that patent pools can be used to 
protect from challenges to the validity of patents of dubious strength. On the other hand, it 
is broadly accepted that patent pools are a way to reduce transaction costs, in comparison 
with bilateral negotiations or litigation. 
Taking into account the previous points it is clear that the terms of most licensing 
agreements are confidential and thus cannot be used as the basis or reference of future 
agreements. Moreover, every single technology licensing arrangement is unique and not 
always is straightforward to extrapolate conditions from one deal to another. 
Given this complexity, having as many published licensing terms as possible would be a 
facilitator for determining licensing terms in subsequent negotiation. In order to achieve it, 
it is recommended that companies agree on this as good practice. Nevertheless, this 
practice is unlikely to be taken by individual companies, as it may undermine their 
bargaining power. Therefore, a better approach may be seeking industry-wide agreements 
or initiatives by regulators and/or legislators to favor this kind of behaviors. 
2.14 SUPPORTING DEFENSIVE PATENT AGGREGATORS 
According to policy makers, defensive patent aggregation is under supplied by market forces 
requiring public support and coordination (OECD 2013). In addition, it is argued that publicly 
controlled funds can more credibly constrain in pursuing aggressive patent assertion 
behaviors. 
However, publicly-backed funds have also drawbacks. First, constraints on patent assertion 
strategies are difficult to define and to implement in practice, especially if the aggregators 
are operated at arm’s length. Second, the intervention of the funds may raise the prices for 
patents without necessarily increasing inventive activities. Third, the competition effects of 
public patent funds are difficult to predict, as they will depend on their precise 
implementation and the composition of their patent portfolio. Fourth, adverse selection and 
moral hazard are common problems both to private and public patent funds. Especially, in 
the case of the latter, the acquisition criteria need to be more specific and transparent for 
accountability purposes. However, the perception of market failure appears to be stronger 
outside the United States, where most private funds operate from and where patents 
markets appear to be most developed. 
The goal of supporting defensive patent aggregators is to generate added value for both the 
licensees, i.e. lowering fees for licensing in patents in bundles, and the patent owners, i.e. 
improving the access to markets and increasing revenues from licensing. Some 
governments, especially in France, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, have contributed 
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financially to the creation of private-public entities, either directly, or through state-owned 
banks, which fund the acquisition of patents from national research organizations. The 
acquired patents are then typically bundled into clusters and licensed out. 
One prominent example of a successful defensive fund is the US-based Open Invention 
Network (OIN), which is not publicly supported. OIN is a shared defensive patent pool with 
the mission to protect Linux, a free computer operating system, and related technologies. 
Any company, project or developer that is working on Linux, GNU, Android or any other 
Linux-related software can join OIN free of charge or royalties. Its mission is “to safeguard 
developers, distributors and users from organizations that would leverage intellectual 
property to hinder its growth and innovation”. It does so by acquiring and sharing patents to 
promote a collaborative Linux ecosystem. On the one hand, OIN cross licenses the patent 
portfolios of OIN community members for a well-defined, domain-specific field of use that 
includes key open source technologies. On the other hand, it provides a royalty-free license 
to its strategic IP portfolio. 
Despite the theoretical arguments justifying a public support of defensive patent 
aggregators, the success of the few existing public initiatives is limited. In contrast, there is a 
proof that privately initiated, market driven programmes like OIN can be very successful. 
Consequently, it remains ambivalent whether public support initiatives are effective in 
remedying possible market failures.   
2.15 INSURING PATENT PORTFOLIOS 
The ability to enforce rights is essential for patents to keep its value, but many companies, 
especially SMEs, do not have the necessary financial or legal means. Litigation insurance, if it 
was available for patents, would allow for the sharing of the financial burden and risks 
associated with patent litigation. Such insurance schemes would help especially innovative 
companies to manage more effectively the costs and potential financial risk of litigation. It 
would also provide better negotiation power within patent disputes increasing the 
likelihood of innovative companies obtaining more favorable settlements.  
However, the market for insurance products for been too limited in the EU Member States. 
In the majority of the Member States, such insurance schemes do not exist or are unknown. 
Publicly supported insurance schemes do in general not exist. An exception is, on the one 
hand, the UK, where there is the opportunity to obtain insurance policies to cover the 
insured entity against its own legal costs and/or the legal costs of someone the entity is in 
dispute with. Within a programme providing innovation, vouchers may be also used to 
purchase insurance. On the other hand, in Denmark, the patent office supports the 
emergence of patent insurance products. However, initiatives to support the availability and 
access to insurance products on patents and other IPR did not take off in France due to lack 
of demand.  
Consequently, the European Commission (2016) is currently supporting insurance 
companies to enter the market for litigation insurances and assisting innovative SMEs to 
access such services.  
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In contrast, the RPX Corporation (http://www.rpxcorp.com) is obviously providing 
successfully patent risk solutions in the US. Pointing to the risk of patent troll or NPE (non-
practicing entity) litigation, RPX is buying patents to prevent especially this type of litigation.   
Hagiu and Yoffie (2013) characterize them as defensive aggregators and argue that in 
contrast to traditional insurance companies, which become active when accidents, RPX gets 
paid to reduce the probability of accidents, i.e. lawsuits. 
2.16 TRADE SECRETS 
A baseline option of companies trying to protect their inventions is to keep them secret. 
Despite their economic relevance, and in particular their role in protecting returns from 
innovation, trade secrets5 are rarely studied, because of the missing empirical evidence in 
contrast to the publicly available information about patent applications. However, the 
recently released Trade Secrets Directive (European Union 2016), which is trying to 
harmonize the legal frameworks in the EU Member States, increased the attention on this 
basic instrument.  
In theory, patenting and secrecy is treated as substitutes. In practice, both protection 
methods are used simultaneously and in a complementary manner not only for different 
innovations at the firm level. However, firms may also choose to apply both strategies at the 
level of individual innovations by protecting some elements of a technology through patents 
and keeping others secret. In general, innovations involve both codified and tacit 
knowledge. Consequently, firms may apply patents for the codified knowledge and try to 
keep the tacit knowledge secret. Even, keeping the codified part of an invention secret and 
deciding about patenting later might be an option. 
The complementary roles of the two protection methods are recently confirmed based on 
the large scale data base (EUIPO 2017). However, the use of trade secrets for protecting 
innovations is higher than the of use patents by most types of companies and in most 
economic sectors. The combination is likely to be used by companies with internal R&D, 
with high innovation expenditure and when the innovation is new to the market. 
Considering the sectorial level, manufacturers of computer, electronic and optical products 
is both patents and secrecy more intensively. Trade secrets are the preferred instrument if 
                                                     
55 An internationally agreed definition of trade secrecy can already be found in Article 39 of the TRIPS 
Agreement (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1994). 
This definition is also used in Article 2 of the recently adopted EU directive on the protection 
of trade secrets6: 
(1) ‘trade secret’ means information which meets all of the following requirements: 
(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly of its 
components, generally known among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal with 
the kind of information in question; 
(b) has commercial value because it is secret; 
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the 
information, to keep it secret. 
Trade secrets are not registered and the duration of their protection is not limited to a set term as is usually 
the case with patents and other intellectual property rights. 
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the innovations are new only to the firm. As expected, patents are more likely to be used, 
when the innovative product is a physical good rather than a service. In contrast, companies 
active in computer programming, consultancy and related activities are strongly focusing on 
trade secrets and are less considering patents. 
In summary, trade secrets are an important protection instrument complementary to 
patents in ICT-related technologies. However, the complementary role is less prominent for 
companies in the software and ICT consultancy business, for which trade secrets are 
significantly more important. 
  
© CIFRA Consortium 2017-2018                                                                                    Page 23 of 46 
3 EXTRAPOLATING THE OPEN SOURCE PARADIGM TO PATENTS 
The open source software has a good level of maturity and has proven useful to create rich 
ecosystems, which have generated wealth for many involved companies and progress and 
welfare for the society. Of course, there is room for open source software but also for 
proprietary software. Both worlds have proven compatible and each has its own reach. 
In the realm of inventions and patents, there are initiatives similar to OSS, for instance, 
different sort of patent pledges by which the patent holders give up some of the rights 
linked to their patents. However, they are far beyond OSS in terms of reliability, recognition 
by the industry and success. These tools have a protection function to some ecosystems 
(e.g. Open Invention Network for Linux) but as opposed to OSS, they have not been so far 
the basis on which successful ecosystems are created. There may be different reasons for 
that. Firstly, the asset resulting from OSS projects and been handed over to the community 
is software, which can be an end product itself or a building block for an end product 
involving other assets (hardware, other software components, etc.). On the contrary, 
patents are recipes, and thus having a license over a patent does not save the work to 
implement or build the technology, unless provided together with other assets (like 
software). Also, patents are assets that require substantial investment to register, prosecute 
and maintain, whereas software copyright does not need formal registration and, if done, it 
is comparably cheap. Therefore, just a minority of companies take the effort to file patents 
to later waive some of the associated rights. Instead, many companies do not file the patent 
in the first place if they do not intend to assert them. Another reason is the lack of a 
normalized set of well-known proofed licenses, as opposed to the case of OSS, where a few 
licenses cope the vast majority of the OSS projects. One last identified potential reason is 
the fact that it is easier to identify who owns the copyright over a code than to identify who 
owns the Intellectual Property Rights associated with a specific technology or product. In 
the latter case, it may be bound to many patents from different players, which may not have 
directly participated in the definition of the technology or the creation of the product. 
3.1 OPEN SOURCE LICENSES AND MAPPING TO PATENTS 
This section analyses different characteristics of Free and Open Source Software, and 
considers whether there is an equivalent in the field of patented inventions. If there is no 
equivalence or there is some gap, an indication is made as to how this gap could be 
overcome. 
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Free / Open 
Source Software 
characteristic 
Impact in collaborative 
innovation and societal 
welfare 
Mapping to patent 
system 
Fulfilment by patent system Filing the gap 
Free Software Foundation’s Definition 
Freedom to Run 
(Use)  
Improves societal 
welfare by allowing any 
interested party to 
benefit from the 
technology. 
Right to practice 
the invention 
Any third party is excluded from 
implementing and using the 
patent unless it has explicit 
permission from patent holder 
(license) or the patent holder has 
proactively made a non-
assertion pledge. 
A similar model to OSS in 
the patent system would 
require reliable licenses 
by which patent holders 
allow the practice of 
patented inventions. 
Freedom to Study Facilitates an actual 
diffusion of knowledge, 
by allowing not just 
using a software but 
also understanding how 
it works. 
Patents as a source 
of knowledge, 
providing enough 
information to 
allow 
implementing the 
invention.  
It is one of the pillars of the 
patent system. However, patents 
are not always educational in 
practice, but instead, use 
obscure language and try to be 
as generic as possible.  
Patent offices would be 
required to ensure that 
each patent is 
implementable by the 
sheer analysis of the 
patent document, as a 
requisite for granting the 
patent. 
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Freedom to 
Redistribute 
The society benefits 
from a wider diffusion 
of knowledge (the 
software) by allowing 
any recipient of the 
software to redistribute 
it to any third party. 
(interpretation 1) 
Redistribute patent 
document 
(interpretation 2) 
Redistribute (sale) 
product 
implementing the 
patented invention 
(interpretation 1) Fulfilled by 
default: Patents are published 
usually 18 months after filing 
unless the patent holder wants 
to withdraw the application 
without publishing it. 
(interpretation 2) Any third party 
is excluded from selling products 
implementing the patent unless 
it has explicit permission from 
patent holder (license) or the 
patent holder has proactively 
made a non-assertion pledge  
(interpretation 1) Early 
publication of patent 
applications should be 
allowed and fostered. 
(interpretation 2) 
A similar model to OSS in 
the patent system would 
require reliable licenses 
by which patent holders 
allow the sale of products 
implementing the 
patented inventions. 
Freedom to 
Improve 
OSS users do not need 
to start new 
development from 
scratch but can rely on 
the OSS state-of-the-art. 
Subsequent 
Inventions 
Patent law allows to file 
inventions based on previous 
ones, but practicing those 
incremental inventions may 
require explicit permission of the 
primary patent’s owner 
A similar model to OSS in 
the patent system would 
require reliable licenses 
by which patent holders 
allow the practice of a 
patent that is the basis of 
subsequent inventions, 
therefore not hindering 
the practice of the latter 
Open Source Initiative’ Definition (characteristics not already mentioned above) 
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Integrity of the 
Author's Source 
Code. The author 
may require 
modifications to 
be distributed as 
"patch files" 
instead of 
modifying its 
original code. 
Provides certainty to 
authors, that 
modifications by third 
parties will be not 
attributed to them, thus 
removing potential 
barriers for authors 
willing to release the 
source code.  
Patent holder’s 
control over own 
patent 
applications. 
Patent documents cannot be 
modified by third parties but just 
by the patent holder. 
 
Subsequent inventions are 
protected by separate patent 
applications, managed by the 
corresponding patent holder. 
No gap 
No Discrimination 
Against Persons or 
Groups 
Basic for societal 
fairness. 
Patent law and 
regulation 
Patent law and regulation 
ensures that no entity is 
discriminated against, as well as 
patent licensing does not follow 
anticompetitive practices. 
Any patent license should 
follow the non-
discrimination principles. 
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No Discrimination 
Against Fields of 
Endeavor 
Ensures that broader 
application of the 
software is possible. 
Patent law. Patent 
pledges and 
private patent 
licenses. 
Patent law does not restrict the 
application of an invention to 
any specific field of endeavor, 
beyond the own limitations of 
the invention itself. Patent law 
does limit the patentable subject 
matter, leaving outside some 
applications mainly for ethical 
reasons, either because they 
should not be subject of an 
exclusion right but instead 
remain in the public domain (e.g. 
methods for treatment of the 
human body) or because its 
questioned morality (e.g. human 
clonation). However, this 
discrimination is perceived as 
positive for the societal welfare. 
 
Patent pledges and private 
patent licenses may include 
clauses that discriminate the 
application of the invention (e.g. 
just for research purposes). 
Patent licenses following 
the principles of OSS 
licenses should not 
discriminate against 
fields of endeavor. 
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Distribution of 
License. The rights 
apply to all to 
whom the 
program is 
redistributed 
without the need 
for execution of 
an additional 
license. 
Ensures a broader 
distribution of the 
benefits of the license, 
removing the burden to 
explicitly sign a license 
agreement. 
Patent pledges 
waiving rights 
without the need 
to sign any 
agreement. 
Patent law does not provide any 
automatic right to third parties, 
but on the contrary, excludes by 
default from practicing the 
invention. 
 
Patent pledges could be the 
closest equivalent of OSS 
licenses, but they present some 
gaps (reliability and the lack of 
well-known proofed and 
established licenses) 
Reliable, well-known and 
proofed patent pledges / 
licenses should be 
defined, with them 
applying without the 
need of explicitly 
executing the license. 
License Must Not 
Be Specific to a 
Product 
Ensures that broader 
application of the 
software is possible. 
Patent pledges and 
private patent 
licenses. 
Patent pledges and private 
patent licenses may include 
clauses that discriminate the 
application of the invention (e.g. 
just for research purposes or for 
use in a specific product) 
Patent licenses following 
the principles of OSS 
licenses should not be 
specific to a product. 
License must not 
place restrictions 
on other software 
that is distributed 
along with the 
licensed software 
Removes a potential 
barrier for parties 
willing to release open 
source code. 
Patent pledges and 
private patent 
licenses. 
Private patent licenses may 
include whatever type of 
clauses, although clauses with 
limitations to other products 
distributed alongside the 
licensed one are not usual. 
Patent licenses following 
the principles of OSS 
licenses should not place 
restrictions on other 
products distributed 
alongside the licensed 
one. 
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License Must Be 
Technology-
Neutral. This is 
aimed at licenses 
which require an 
explicit gesture of 
assent in order to 
establish a 
contract between 
licensor and 
licensee 
(e.g."click-wrap") 
Ensures a broader 
distribution of the 
software, not limiting 
the technology used for 
distribution of the 
software (e.g. FTP). 
N/A N/A N/A 
Legal Basis 
Copyright 
ownership  
OSS licenses may 
include obligations for 
the recipient of the 
software (licensee) so 
that the spirit of the 
license is honored. The 
rights granted by the 
copyright law can 
ensure adherence of 
OSS users to the 
principles of the license. 
Patent ownership The right to exclude granted by 
the patent law to the patent 
holder can ensure adherence to 
the principles of a patent license 
No gap. In fact, Patent 
rights are perceived as 
stronger than copyright. 
Clauses in specific OSS licenses 
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Explicit patent 
license granted by 
contributors (For 
instance in GPLv3 
or Apache 2.0), 
and also for 
redistributors 
(GPLv3) 
Provides legal certainty 
to licensees that 
contributors will not 
assert the related 
patents. 
Non-assertion 
covenants (e.g. as 
per IPR policy of 
royalty-free SDOs), 
or explicit licenses 
granted in patent 
pledges. 
Patent law does not provide any 
automatic right to third parties, 
but on the contrary, excludes by 
default from practicing the 
invention. 
 
Certain types of patent pledges 
(e.g. non-assertion covenants) 
could be the equivalent of open 
source, but they present some 
gaps (reliability and the lack of 
well-known proofed and 
established licenses) 
Reliable, well-known and 
proofed patent licenses 
should be defined. 
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Defensive 
Termination upon 
litigation, 
preventing patent 
litigation initiated 
by licensees. (For 
instance, Apache 
2.0 license 
terminates any 
granted patent 
license to any 
party instituting 
patent litigation 
for infringement 
by the licensed 
work) 
Reduces the risks due to 
infringement of third 
party patents. 
Patent pledges 
create a safe 
ecosystem by 
preventing 
litigation in a 
specific realm: 
Open Innovation 
Network6 
(protecting Linux 
ecosystem), 
Defensive Patent 
Licenses (avoiding 
litigation between 
participants)  
Initiatives in the patent realm 
are non-normalized and 
independent from each other. 
For instance, Open Innovation 
Network may be seen a 
comparable example, however, 
it is restricted to the protection 
of Linux, and the model has not 
been extrapolated to other 
fields. On the other hand, the 
Defensive Patent License limits 
litigation between participants 
with regards to any field, not 
allowing the project-by-project 
granularity of OSS licenses. 
A set of normalized 
patent pledge licenses 
should be defined, 
limiting the patent 
infringement litigation 
initiation by any licensee, 
on a granular basis (e.g. 
per project or product) 
                                                     
6 http://www.openinventionnetwork.com 
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License 
advertisement in 
the source code 
files (file header 
and/or specific 
LICENSE file) or 
when running the 
code. (For 
instance, Apache 
2.0 requires 
recipients of the 
work or derivative 
works to receive a 
copy of the 
license) 
This notice ensures that 
every recipient or user 
of the software is aware 
of their rights and 
obligations 
“License of right” 
indication in some 
patent offices 
indicating the 
willingness to 
license the patent.  
 
Patent pledges 
usually 
communicated by 
means of unofficial 
media (blogs, web 
pages, press 
releases, etc.) 
With the exception of the 
“License of right” indication in 
some patent offices, the patent 
record does not include 
information on explicit rights 
waived by the patent holder, nor 
is there an alternative official 
patent pledge register. It is not a 
common practice to include such 
information together with a 
product either (at most 
information that the product 
implements patented 
technology) 
Mirroring the OSS case 
could be done by means 
of a more explicit 
indication of licensing 
terms (e.g. mentioning a 
specific license or a set of 
waived rights) in the 
patent record. 
Additionally, or 
alternatively creating an 
official patent pledge 
register.  
 
Considering including an 
indication linked to 
products implementing 
the invention, whenever 
the patent holder has 
waived some rights. 
Attribution (For 
instance, GPLv3 
requires keeping 
copyright notices 
upon distribution) 
Provides certainty to 
authors, that their work 
will be attributed to 
them and facilitates 
them to prove copyright 
over the code, thus 
removing potential 
barriers for authors 
willing to release the 
source code. 
Patent inventors 
and owner 
Patents are published including 
the name of the inventors and 
its owner.  
No Gap 
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Virality, that is, 
redistribution of 
the work or 
modified work 
must be done 
under the same 
license (copyleft 
licenses, such as 
GPLv3 and the 
whole GPL license 
family) 
Ensures that modified 
versions of the work 
remain in the public 
domain according to the 
same principles. 
Some patent 
pledges (e.g. Open 
Invention Network, 
Defensive Patent 
Licenses, or IPR 
policy applying to 
contributors to 
royalty-free 
standards) can be 
the most similar 
cases in the patent 
realm, as they 
create a 
community in 
which all different 
parties make the 
same 
commitments. 
Some patent pledges have a 
similar effect but as they are 
non-normalized, there is no well-
recognized and proofed license 
to use, as in the case of OSS, 
with the GPL license family. 
 
. 
A normalized patent 
pledge with viral effect 
should be defined. 
Permissive 
licenses allowing 
to use the 
technology 
without many 
obligations to the 
licensee (for 
instance MIT, BSD 
2-clause licenses 
just require 
keeping the 
copyright notice.) 
Provides full liberty to 
licensees, allowing the 
reuse of the code even 
for proprietary 
products. These licenses 
allow a broader re-use 
of the technology at the 
expense of not requiring 
licensees to release the 
code of modified works. 
Some patent 
pledges, such as 
the non-assertion 
covenants, with no 
obligation on those 
benefiting from it.  
Some patent pledges have a 
similar effect but as they are 
non-normalized, there is no well-
recognized and proofed license 
to use, as in the case of OSS 
permissive licenses. 
 
A normalized permissive 
patent pledge should be 
defined. 
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Avoiding anti-
circumvention of 
protection 
measures, e.g. 
DRM. (For 
instance, GPLv3 
protects user from 
protection 
measures, 
avoiding them in 
licensed software 
and giving users 
the rights to 
circumvent them 
if existing) 
This type of clauses 
avoid tricks used by 
some companies that 
release code as open 
source but 
implementing some 
measures that avoid 
modified versions to 
properly work. 
N/A N/A N/A 
License Management 
© CIFRA Consortium 2017-2018                                                                                    Page 35 of 46 
Principles that OSS 
licenses should 
comply with, 
determined by a 
non-profit, 
independent 
entity, Open 
Source Initiative 
(OSI) for open 
source, and Free 
software 
Foundation (FSF) 
for Free Software 
and GPL licenses. 
OSI also 
rubberstamps the 
conformance of 
specific licenses to 
OSS principles, 
and publish the 
list of conformant 
licenses  
Ensure that licenses are 
trustable, consistent 
and fulfilling a set of 
principles. In some 
cases (e.g. FSF with GPL 
license) take care of the 
evolution of licenses to 
overcome detected 
issues. 
Some 
organizations deal 
with specific 
patent licenses or 
non-assertion 
ecosystems (e.g. 
Open Innovation 
Network for Linux; 
SDOs ruled by 
royalty-free 
policies, etc.) 
There is no organization dealing 
with patent pledges in general, 
but just specific organizations 
dealing with portions of the 
overall ecosystem. 
An independent non-
profit organization would 
need to be created to 
define the principles of 
patent pledges, and a set 
of normalized licenses 
and /or to rubberstamp 
those licenses that 
adhere to the defined 
principles. 
 
3.2 CREATIVE COMMONS LICENSES AND MAPPING TO PATENTS 
In parallel to OSS, other initiatives allow the owners of copyright over non-software material (e.g. text, pictures, etc.) to waive some of the 
associated rights. The most famous is the Creative Commons7 initiative, which fosters free sharing of copyright protected material as an 
                                                     
7 https://creativecommons.org/ 
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alternative to the default “all rights reserved” model. The following table analyses the characteristics of Creative Commons, and figures out 
whether there is an equivalent in the field of patented inventions. If there is no equivalence or there is some gap, an indication is made as to how 
this gap could be overcome. 
 
Creative 
Commons 
characteristic 
Impact in collaborative 
innovation and societal 
welfare 
Mapping to patent 
system 
Fulfilment by patent system Filing the gap 
Freedom to use the 
work itself. 
Improves societal 
welfare by allowing any 
interested party to 
benefit from the work. 
Right to practice 
the invention 
Any third party is excluded from 
implementing and using the 
patent unless it has explicit 
permission from patent holder 
(license) or the patent holder has 
proactively made a non-assertion 
pledge. 
A similar model to CC in 
the patent system would 
require reliable licenses 
by which patent holders 
allow the use of the 
patented inventions. 
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Freedom to use the 
information in the 
work for any 
purpose. 
Improves societal 
welfare by allowing any 
interested party to 
benefit from the work, 
and to learn from 
examining its details and 
eventually reverse-
engineering it. 
Right to analyze 
the details of the 
invention and use 
the information for 
any purpose 
Patent documents are public but 
may be subject to copyright in 
certain legislations. Regarding 
the technical content, any third 
party is excluded from 
implementing and using the 
patent, unless it has explicit 
permission from patent holder 
(license) or the patent holder has 
proactively made a non-assertion 
pledge.  
 
Technical information in patent 
documents may be subject to 
other previous patent rights. 
 
Reverse engineering of any 
physical product (even those 
protected by patents) is not 
forbidden in general, although 
patent documents should ideally 
be self-explanatory in order to 
allow the implementation of the 
invention from it. 
A similar model to CC in 
the patent system would 
require changing those 
legislations in which 
patent applications are 
subject to copyright. 
 
In addition, reliable 
licenses would be 
required by which patent 
holders allow the use of 
the patented inventions, 
ideally licenses that 
create ecosystems that 
foster the licensing of 
subsequent patents on 
similar terms. 
Freedom to share 
copies of the work 
for any purpose. 
Improves societal 
welfare by allowing any 
interested party to 
benefits from the work. 
Right to practice 
the invention 
Any third party is excluded from 
implementing and using the 
patent unless it has explicit 
permission from patent holder 
(license) or the patent holder has 
proactively made a non-assertion 
pledge. 
A similar model to CC in 
the patent system would 
require reliable licenses 
by which patent holders 
allow the use of the 
patented inventions. 
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Freedom to make 
and share remixes 
and other 
derivatives for any 
purpose. 
Improves societal 
welfare by allowing the 
creation of additional 
works based on the 
original one. 
Subsequent 
inventions 
Any third party is allowed to 
create subsequent inventions 
based on a patent and to protect 
them by means of patents. 
However practicing those 
subsequent inventions may 
require permission of the owner 
of the original patent 
A similar model to CC in 
the patent system would 
require reliable licenses 
by which patent holders 
allow the use of the 
patented inventions and 
that foster the licensing of 
subsequent patents on 
similar terms. 
Attribution. 
Obligation to 
provide attribution 
of the original 
work upon 
redistribution 
Provides certainty to 
authors, that their work 
will be attributed to 
them and facilitates 
them to prove copyright 
over the material, thus 
removing potential 
barriers for authors 
willing to release 
material. 
Patent inventors 
and owner 
Patents are published including 
the name of the inventors and its 
owner. 
 
Patent documents are required to 
cite patents on which they are 
based, so attribution is kept even 
in subsequent inventions. 
No Gap 
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Share alike. 
Option to limit 
previous freedoms 
by requiring 
derivative works 
to be shared using 
the same license 
Ensures that modified 
versions of the work 
remain in the public 
domain according to the 
same principles. 
Some patent 
pledges (e.g. Open 
Invention Network, 
Defensive Patent 
Licenses, or IPR 
policy applying to 
contributors to 
royalty-free 
standards) can be 
the most similar 
cases in the patent 
realm, as they 
create a community 
in which all 
different parties 
make the same 
commitments. 
Some patent pledges have a 
similar effect but as they are non-
normalized, there is no well-
recognized and proofed license to 
use, as in the case of CC Share 
Alike licenses. 
A normalized patent 
pledge with viral effect 
should be defined. 
Option to allow or 
forbid distribution 
of derivative 
works. (The latter 
case limits the 
previous 
freedoms) 
Provides flexibility to 
authors, thus removing 
potential barriers for 
authors willing to waive 
certain rights but not 
allowing derivative 
works 
Private patent 
licenses or patent 
pledges. 
Private patent licenses or patent 
pledges may include clauses 
limiting the rights over 
subsequent inventions. 
Patent licenses following 
the CC principles should 
allow the option to limit 
the rights over subsequent 
inventions 
Option to allow or 
forbid commercial 
use of the material 
or modified 
versions. (The 
latter case limits 
the previous 
freedoms) 
Provides flexibility to 
authors, thus removing 
potential barriers for 
authors willing to waive 
certain rights but not for 
commercial purposes 
Private patent 
licenses or patent 
pledges. 
Private patent licenses or patent 
pledges may include clauses that 
discriminate the application of 
the invention (e.g. not for 
commercial purposes). 
Normalized patent 
licenses should consider 
both cases: allowing or 
forbidding the 
commercial use of the 
invention. 
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3.3 PATENT LICENSING FRAMEWORK FOLLOWING OSS MODEL 
This section depicts a Patent Licensing Framework following the principles and 
characteristics of OSS and Creative Commons. It describes general clauses that every license, 
following these principles should include, as well as the differential aspects that may 
differentiate the different licenses. Also, a managing framework for the licenses is 
described. 
3.3.1 General Assumptions 
 Licenses will not discriminate against persons or groups, nor against fields of endeavor. 
 Licenses will not require explicit acceptance from licensees. 
 Licenses will be universal, not limited for instance to a specific product. Note that 
patents are meant to be licensed on an individual basis, so this assumption is not related 
to a need to license all the members of a patent family. 
3.3.2 General Clauses 
 Right to Practice a patent. It may be an explicit license or a non-assertion covenant. The 
commitment must be universal, that is, available to any interested party. 
 Defensive Termination upon litigation. The license automatically terminates upon the 
licensee (or affiliate) initiating patent litigation against the licensor (or affiliate). 
 License Advertisement: The distributor of a product or service that benefits from the 
license must advertise the fact to the recipients of the product or service. 
3.3.3 Optional Clauses 
Each specific license will choose one of the following options: 
 Viral: Someone distributing a product infringing a licensed patent must license any other 
patent it has right to practice that is implemented in said product and are valid in the 
places where distributor wants to benefit from the license. 
 Permissive: No obligation with regards to licensing patents on the recipients of the 
license or distributor of a product infringing a licensed patent. 
Each specific license will choose whether it is restricted to non-commercial use or no such 
restriction applies 
Each specific license will choose whether it allows recipients to own exclusive patent rights 
over subsequent inventions based on the licensed patent. A limitation in this regard may be 
in the form of not allowing filing such patents or alternatively mandating those subsequent 
patents to be licensed following the same or less restrictive license. 
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3.4 SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS OF EXTRAPOLATING THE OSS PARADIGM TO ICT PATENTS 
This section explores a scenario in which a paradigm equivalent to Open Source Software in 
the realm of ICT patents becomes a reality, not at a minor scale but with significant impact. 
It is relevant to measure the plausibility of this scenario, by looking at the incentives the 
different parties may have, as well as to assess the impact it would have on the society. 
3.4.1 Incentives and Plausibility 
The open source software movement is not new, but on the contrary, it was born back in 
the 1980’ and thus has a background of over 30 years. Over these decades, OSS has proven 
not to be an anecdote but a real option, and plenty of organizations and individuals have 
found incentives to contribute to open source projects and/or to use products based on 
them. These incentives are economic, utilitarian and/or reputational, depending on the 
case. That is, some companies have proven to be able to build sustainable and profitable 
business models around open source software, for instance, by selling professional services 
related to free OSS products. Moreover, communities of individuals have been interested in 
developing OSS projects without a direct economic return but instead intangible rewards 
such as personal satisfaction, improved professional reputation or the benefit derived from 
the use of an OSS-based product that has been adapted to the needs of the contributor. 
The open source software relies on two basic tools, firstly an intellectual property right, the 
copyright, and secondly a variety of licenses that allow the owners of the copyright to give 
up part of the legal rights that it confers, under certain conditions. 
In parallel, similar initiatives in the realm of patents, i.e. the patent pledges (Contreras, 
2015, Contreras 2017), have been put in place over the last years. Patent pledges can be 
seen as the analogy of OSS to the extend that they rely on an Intellectual Property Right and 
by voluntarily giving up some of their rights conferred they facilitate the access to the 
technology to third parties in more convenient terms, or even for free, provided that certain 
rules are followed. Nevertheless, the impact of patent pledges may not have been as huge 
as in the case of OSS, and many of these initiatives have ended up losing heart, perhaps with 
the sole exception of the FRAND commitments required by Standard Development 
Organizations, which although subject to be further improved remain a widely used and well 
regarded tool. 
In order to figure out the reasons for the differences between OSS licenses and patent 
pledges, it is important to analyze the grounds on which both tools are built. In fact, the 
intellectual property right on which patent pledges are based is the patent, which is 
different in many aspects to copyright. As opposed to copyright, which arises by the sheer 
creation process and does not requires a formal registration, patents need to be applied for. 
Moreover, the process to get the right granted demands significant resources, efforts and 
time, and there is no success guarantee. In order to have meaningful chances of getting a 
patent granted it is necessary to count with the help of a professional agent who drafts and 
files the patent application. Apart from the agent’s fees, the patent offices impose certain 
fees for the filing and subsequent processes during the patent prosecution. 
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Taking previous points into account the entry barrier to file patents for later pledging part of 
the rights is much higher than in the case of copyright. In fact, individuals will hardly enter 
into such arrangements. It is not the same to devote some efforts to develop a piece of 
software and, without any additional monetary investment, revert it to the community, than 
to invest resources in filing a patent in order to later give up some of the rights associated to 
it. An individual that is interested in making an invention available to the community would 
most probably publish it, making it part of the public domain, and avoiding third parties to 
patent it if they ever come up with the same invention. 
The scenario is different for enterprises, as they can obtain benefits by pledging patents that 
outweigh the resources invested in filing a patent. These benefits may be of several types. 
Firstly, companies pledging patents get a reward in terms of image. For instance, the “Eco-
patent Commons”8 wass an initiative, recently discontinued, aimed to facilitate the use of 
existing innovation that is protective of the environment, by which the companies joining 
the initiative providing the right to practice free of charge some/all of their environment-
friendly patents to members and non-members. Beyond the direct benefit the member 
companies obtain by gaining access to other members’ inventions, the initiative provides an 
unquestionable benefit in term of image and reputation.  
Other initiatives may be aimed at creating an ecosystem or making it flourish, seeking 
indirectly an economic benefit or a better strategic positioning for a company. For instance 
Tesla, the electric car manufacturer, pledged all its patents in 20149, stating that “Tesla will 
not initiate patent lawsuits against anyone who, in good faith, wants to use our technology”. 
This was interpreted as a move to foster their view and technological implementation of the 
electric car and thus gaining positive network economies, for instance by facilitating the 
creation of a network of charging stations, fundamental for their business to succeed in 
addition of economies of scale achieved by entering mass production. 
An example in the ICT sector of a joint patent pledge by a myriad of companies to protect an 
ecosystem is the Open Invention Network (OIN)10, a shared defensive patent pool with the 
mission to protect Linux, GNU, Android or any other Linux-related software. Plenty of 
companies promote by means of this initiative a stable and trustable framework in which 
developers continue to develop software on these platforms and users continue to use it. 
This has an unquestionable positive impact in the business of these companies. 
An example of defensive patent pledge is the LOT Agreement11, by which more than 
hundred companies commit to grant irrevocable licenses to the other members whenever 
they transfer a patent to a Patent Assertion Entity, thus providing protection against the 
practices of these entities. Thus the LOT is an example of patent pledge whereby 
participating companies get a clear defensive value. As of the date of writing these network 
                                                     
8 http://www.corporateecoforum.com/welcome-to-the-eco-patent-commons/ (last visited March 14th, 2018) 
9 https://www.tesla.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you (last visited March 14th, 2018) 
10 http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/ (last visited March 19th, 2018) 
11 https://www.google.com/patents/licensing/lot/ (last visited March 23rd, 2018) 
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gathers over 800.000 patent rights. LOT Network requires the payment of an annual fee, 
proportional to the revenues, providing free membership to small companies and start-ups. 
It can be noted that the advantages obtained by patent pledges could in most cases not be 
obtained by just making the technology available in the public domain, as the patent rights 
provide the power to counteract patent rights from third parties opposing the aims of the 
patent pledges. 
Now looking at the licensee side, in the case of OSS the software is an asset that can be 
reused with relatively low effort. Therefore, it can be affirmed that the asset that is provided 
to the community is easy to consume. On the contrary, patents remain more abstract. 
Getting the right to use an invention protected by patents do not reduce drastically the 
effort to implement it. The patent can be seen as a recipe, but the beneficiary of a patent 
pledge still need to “cook” the technology following that recipe, and thus there is still a 
significant barrier for the consumption of the technology by the community, that may 
account with part of the responsibility of patent pledges being not as widespread and 
successful as OSS. 
As a summary, patent pledges, as the equivalent to open source software in the realm of 
utility inventions, is not something workable for individuals, but it is a good option for 
companies under certain circumstances and with some specific objectives. As it happens in 
the case of open source software, patent pledges are not a panacea, and their application is 
not mainstream but limited to just a limited set of circumstances. 
One of the main impediments for a wider use of patent pledges is the absence of well-
known and proven licenses that provide confidence to the user / implementer about the 
legal rights conferred by the license. This is one of the differential aspects with regards to 
open source software, where a set of licenses are broadly known and accepted. In fact, one 
of most common ways to perform a patent pledge is as part of an open source software 
license. Therefore, probably one of the most relevant pending issues to make patent 
pledges as popular as open source software is the normalization of a set of licenses. 
Another relevant aspect to highlight is the fact that patent pledges should remain a 
voluntary decision by the patent owners in order to resemble their counterpart in the 
software arena, the open source software licenses. Other type of actions to limit the rights 
conferred by a patent in the current status quo, e.g. reducing patents’ lifespan or forcing a 
License-of-Right, is not to be considered as an equivalent of the open source software 
model. 
3.4.2 Positive effects on social welfare 
This section describes the eventual positive effects that could derive from a popularization 
of patent pledges and its perfection as a legal tool. 
The most immediate benefit would be the improvement of social welfare by a wider 
diffusion of knowledge and technologies. Having free access to invention by others, not only 
more companies/entities would be able to implement them in their product/services, but 
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also the increased offer and the lack of royalties would facilitate the offer of cheaper 
products/services. 
Moreover, the free access to patented technology would have an additional positive impact, 
namely the opportunity to unleash the creation of incentives to create subsequent 
innovations that would not be restricted by the exclusionary effect of the primary patent, 
but could be exploited by the creator of the subsequent invention. This could create a 
virtuous circle, in which more inventions are created and more advance technology is made 
available to the society. This effect would be even more relevant if the patent pledge 
requires some sort of reciprocity, that is, requires subsequent patents to be pledged on 
similar terms, as a prerequisite to benefit from the patent pledge made by the owner of the 
primary patent. This type of pledges, similarly to copyleft open source software licenses, 
would ensure that modified versions of the work remain in the public domain according to 
the same principles. 
On the other hand, multilateral patent pledges, that is those that are not performed by a 
single entity but by a set of actors create a safe ecosystem by preventing litigation in a 
specific realm. This type of pledges make the patented technology freely available to the 
other entities taking part in the pledge or in some cases even to any other party that 
complies with certain rules. 
3.4.3 Negative effects on social welfare 
A scenario in which patent rights are devaluated to certain extent could cause companies to 
reduce their efforts in innovation, due to the increased troubles to get a proper return on it, 
and/or to give priority to trade secret over patenting. 
The scenario we are analysing is though different, as it reflects a voluntary decision by 
certain entities to go for a patent pledge, as opposed to fully exercising the exclusionary 
right of patents. Even under this assumption some secondary negative effects may arise, 
although it magnitude would be much lower than in case of a forced and universal 
devaluation of patent rights. For instance, in a technological realm in which patent pledges 
become mainstream, and most actors provide free access to their patents, the incentive to 
produce a huge number of patents decreases. On the one hand, pledging a core set of 
patents to act as a defensive asset for the community in front of aggressive players not 
taking part on the ecosystem, may provide clear benefits to pledging companies. On the 
other hand, the added value of pledging additional patents drops sharply, and so does the 
incentive to sustain a certain effort in innovation or to protect innovation by means of costly 
patents on which no direct return is to be obtained. 
In the open source software ecosystem the different players choose to be part of the open 
ecosystem or on the contrary to develop their software in a closed fashion. This creates a 
sort of dual market in which companies are aligned in two well differentiated camps, with 
usually opposed interests. This fact causes some tensions, especially whenever an industry-
wide collaboration is required, such as in standards development. In the case of patents, the 
effect could be similar, with to separate camps, firstly the open ecosystem in which each 
actors benefits from each other’s invention, and secondly closed actors that implement 
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proprietary products that can remain differential to some extent, but that do not fully 
benefit from the knowledge shared in the community. It should be noted that a single 
company may decide to bet to open ecosystems on a certain technological realm, and to 
proprietary developments in other areas.  
 
3.4.4 Revisiting EPO’s Scenarios for the Future 
The EPO’s report, Scenarios for the Future (EPO, 2007), analysed in 2007 the trends in the 
patent ecosystems and envisaged four scenarios towards which it could evolve. One of 
these scenarios, the “Trees of Knowledge” one, is especially relevant to the topic under 
analysis in this section. That hypothetical scenario depicted a world in which patents have 
been abolished in most technical fields, mainly as a result of the societal opposition to a 
system that hinders the access by the society to fundamental innovations, such as critical 
pharma products, or the implementation of environmental friendly inventions. Instead, 
sharing information through open source, creative commons, etc. is the norm, and other 
tools such as trade secrecy are used by businesses to protect innovation. However, the 
scenario depicted as a side effect the decrease of the innovation activity as a result of the 
absence of profit expectations. 
It must be acknowledge that this scenario written more than 10 years ago, could have been 
written nowadays. The tensions between societal welfare and the commercial interests 
remain valid at present-day. Although, the scenario is not considered to be plausible in the 
next years / decades the key questions raised remain mostly unsolved, namely: 
 How can public and private interest in IP be reconciled for the benefit of society? 
 How are the ethical and moral dilemmas raised by technology reflected by the 
patent system? 
 Where should the limits to patentability be drawn? By whom? 
As a rough framing of those questions, and in line with EPO’s prediction, it can be said that 
the abolishment of patents would very unlikely have an overall positive effort in the societal 
welfare in the mid-long term, due to its impact in a reduction in the innovation. However, 
the promotion of patent pledges, especially in sensitive fields, such as those with a direct 
impact on citizen’s lifes (health, environment, etc.), be it by the governments, by the 
societal pressure, or by other determining aspects, would have a positive effect both in the 
society and in those entities voluntarily entering in such settlements. 
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